Kansas V. Nebraska & Colorado: Keeping Equity Afloat in the Republican River Dispute by Punia, Charles
PUNIA 11.18.14 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)  11/28/2014 3:58 PM 
 
 
KANSAS V. NEBRASKA & 
COLORADO: KEEPING EQUITY 
AFLOAT IN THE REPUBLICAN 
RIVER DISPUTE 
CHARLES PUNIA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The trouble that sovereigns experience in apportioning scarce 
resources among themselves has led to many disputes throughout 
history.1 The Supreme Court has addressed this problem between the 
States via its power to hear cases of original jurisdiction.2 Here, the 
States may petition the Court directly,3 as the Court alone may 
provide a remedy in cases involving disputes between them.4 In 
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado,5 the Court will consider a dispute 
between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado concerning the 
apportionment of a scarce resource: the water from the Republican 
River Basin.6 
The Court appointed a Special Master to make recommendations 
in Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado.7 The Special Master found that 
Nebraska used more than its share of water, but a mutual mistake in 
the three states’ accounting procedures overstated some of 
Nebraska’s use.8 Additionally, the Special Master found that Kansas 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2016. 
 1.  Charles M. Courtney, Casenote, Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado Allocating Water 
Rights to Interstate Rivers: Equitable Principles and the Role of Substantial Injury, 3 DICK. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 89, 89 (1994). 
 2.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to 
Controversies between two or more States.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 1847, 1847 (2011). 
 4.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 2014) (providing the Supreme Court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases between sovereign states). 
 5.  Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. argued Oct. 14, 2014). 
 6.  Report of the Special Master at 1, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Jan. 13, 
2014) [hereinafter Fourth Report]. 
 7.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. at 1847. 
 8.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 187. 
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should receive monetary relief in the form of compensatory damages 
and disgorgement, but not injunctive relief.9 The parties disputed 
some of the Special Master’s recommendations and submitted their 
exceptions to the Supreme Court. While Nebraska admitted to its 
excess consumption of water,10 a question remains for the Court 
regarding the exact amount of overuse and which remedy is 
appropriate. The Court may decide to approve the Special Master’s 
recommendations in full, it may adopt the exceptions argued by 
Kansas, Nebraska, or Colorado, or it may fashion its own remedy. 
Ultimately, the Court seeks a “fair and equitable solution” in cases 
of original jurisdiction.11 Thus, the Court should approve the 
recommendations of the Special Master who found that the 
accounting procedure contained a mutual mistake and that monetary 
damages, but not injunctive relief, are warranted. While the monetary 
damages should include disgorgement, the Court should take a 
second look at how to calculate disgorgement. 
This comment will provide the factual and legal background 
leading up to Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado and will analyze the 
case’s key issues. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
The Republican River Basin is a watershed that incorporates parts 
of Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas.12 The Republican River originates 
in Colorado, briefly passes through Kansas and then runs into 
Nebraska.13 Finally, the river winds back into Kansas, eventually 
becoming part of the Kansas River.14 In 1942, Kansas, Nebraska, and 
Colorado entered negotiations with the goal of reaching a compact 
concerning apportionment of the Republican River water between 
the three states.15 Compacts of this sort became common, as new 
 
 9.  Id. at 179. 
 10.  Nebraska’s Exceptions & Brief in Support at 2, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original 
(U.S. Feb. 27, 2014).  
 11.  See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987) (stating that the Court has come up 
with what it believes to be a “fair and equitable solution”). 
 12.  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling the Parties’ 
Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master at 3, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original 
(U.S. Apr. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Brief of the United States].  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 4. 
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technologies developed which allowed upriver states to use immense 
amounts of water to the detriment of downriver states.16 
In light of these technological developments’ effect on water use, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado ratified the Republican River 
Compact (the Compact) in 1943,17 and Congress enacteded it that 
same year.18 The Compact allocates the rights to use the Republican 
River Basin’s water supply between the three states.19 Going even 
further, “[t]he Compact quantifies the Republican River Basin’s 
‘Virgin Water Supply,’ which is defined as ‘the water supply within the 
Basin undepleted by the activities of man.’”20 Specifically, the 
Compact allocates 54,100 acre-feet per year to Colorado; 234,500 
acre-feet per year to Nebraska; and 190,300 acre-feet per year to 
Kansas, plus any water originating entirely within Kansas after the 
river’s last intersection with Nebraska.21 Finally, pursuant to the 
Compact, the states created the Republican River Compact 
Administration (RRCA), which is charged with computing each 
state’s usage at yearend.22 
Trouble arose in the 1980s and 1990s.23 Nebraska increased its 
groundwater pumping, which had the effect of depleting water in the 
river basin.24 Kansas alleged that groundwater pumping constituted 
part of each state’s water share under the Compact.25 Nebraska 
disagreed.26 The states resolved this issue at the start of the current 
litigation by adopting Kansas’s stance in the Final Settlement 
Stipulation (FSS).27 
The FSS, agreed to by Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, expressly 
states that it did “not intend[] to . . . change the States’ respective 
rights and obligations under the Compact,”28 but rather addressed 
 
 16.  Aaron M. Popelka, The Republican River Dispute: An Analysis of the Parties’ Compact 
Interpretation and Final Settlement Stipulation, 83 NEB. L. REV. 596, 597–98 (2004). 
 17.  Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 4 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-67-101 
et seq. (West 2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-518 (West 1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. app. § 1-106 (2008)). 
 18.  Id. (citing Act of May 26, 1943, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. (citing Art. II, 57 Stat. 87). 
 21.  Id. at 5 (citing Art. II, 57 Stat. 88). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 6. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 5. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 6. 
 28.  Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1 at 2, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. 
Apr. 16, 2003). 
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accounting procedures for determining compliance.29 In a dry year, 
such as 2006, the accounting procedures determine whether a state 
used more than its water allocation by averaging the state’s use for 
that year and the prior one.30 Nebraska used more water than 
allocated in both 2005 and 2006, and therefore breached the Compact 
in 2006.31 The accounting procedures as written, however, do not 
distinguish between imported water, which originates outside the 
Republican River Basin, and virgin water, which originates inside the 
basin.32 This treatment has the effect of over-calculating a state’s water 
usage when it imports more water relative to its fellow states. 
B.  Procedural History 
The present action commenced on January 19, 1999 when the 
Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction, granted Kansas’s 
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.33 The Court ordered the 
appointment of the Honorable Vincent L. McKusick as Special 
Master.34 Pursuant to this appointment, the Court gave Mr. McKusick 
the authority to direct further proceedings and generate reports.35 
The Court received and filed Mr. McKusick’s first report in 2000.36 
This first report sided with Kansas, finding that the Compact 
encompassed groundwater pumping.37 The Court then invited all 
parties to file “Exceptions to the Report.”38 Subsequently, the Court 
sent the case back to Mr. McKusick for additional proceedings.39 The 
parties then discussed settlement, ultimately coming to agreeable 
 
 29.  See Final Report of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of RRCA 
Groundwater Model at 1, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Sept. 23, 2003) (“The FSS 
laid out the parameters for RRCA Groundwater Model which would, for use in the accounting 
formulas for administering the Republican River Compact, determine . . . stream flow 
depletions.”) [hereinafter Third Report]. 
 30.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 17. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 15. 
 33.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101, 1101 (1999). 
 34.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1999). 
 35.  See id. (granting the Special Master “the authority to fix the time and conditions for 
the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to 
summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced . . . [and] to 
submit such reports as he may deem appropriate”). 
 36.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1151, 1151 (2000). 
 37.  First Report of the Special Master at 23, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. 
Feb. 22, 2000) [hereinafter First Report].  
 38.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. at 1151. 
 39.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272, 1272 (2000). 
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terms through execution of the FSS.40 In the interim, the Court 
received and filed Mr. McKusick’s second report and approved the 
executed FSS.41 Thereafter, in 2003, the Court filed a third report 
approving the RRCA Groundwater Model,42 and discharged Mr. 
McKusick from his duties as Special Master. 
Unfortunately the states’ amicable relations did not last, and the 
dispute rematerialized. Kansas contended that Nebraska overused its 
share of water in the period since the FSS, leading to a breach of the 
Compact in 2006.43 Kansas exhausted its non-litigious commitments 
by submitting the issues before the RRCA and to non-binding 
arbitration, but to no avail.44 Thereafter, the Court granted Kansas’s 
motion for leave to file a petition in April 2011.45 The Court appointed 
Mr. William J. Kayatta (now Judge Kayatta) as the new Special 
Master to direct further proceedings and generate reports.46 
Accordingly, the Special Master conducted proceedings, during the 
course of which Nebraska contended that its breach was not as severe 
as Kansas had indicated. Nebraska argued that the RRCA’s 
accounting erred by including “imported water” from other river 
basins and, instead, should have only included “virgin water” from 
within the Republican River Basin.47 Thus, Nebraska sought an 
alteration to the accounting procedures based on a mutual mistake in 
its execution.48 
After hearing both sides’ arguments, the Special Master produced 
a report (the Fourth Report).49 The Court received and filed the 
Fourth Report in January 2014, and again invited the parties to submit 
briefs regarding their exceptions to the report.50 Subsequently, the 
Court set oral arguments to hear each party’s exceptions,51 and to 
 
 40.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 6. 
 41.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720, 720 (2003).  
 42.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 540 U.S. 964, 964 (2003); see id. (ordering the Special Master to 
file another report that “certif[ies] adoption of the RRCA Groundwater Model.”).  
 43.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 9. 
 44.  Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 8–9.  
 45.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 1847, 1847 (2011). 
 46.  See id. (granting the Special Master the “authority to fix the time and conditions for 
the filing of additional pleadings, to direct subsequent proceedings, to summon witnesses, to 
issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced . . . [and] to submit Reports as he 
may deem appropriate.”). 
 47.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 15. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Fourth Report, supra note 6. 
 50.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S. Ct. 981, 981 (2014).  
 51.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S. Ct. 2744, 2744 (2014).  
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determine whether there was a mutual mistake in the FSS’s execution 
and which remedies Kansas should be afforded for Nebraska’s 
breach. 
III.   LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Article III of the United States Constitution grants the Supreme 
Court “judicial power” over “controversies between two or more 
States.”52 The States, by ratifying the Constitution, gave the Court the 
power to resolve disputes arising between them.53 In fact, the Supreme 
Court maintains “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies between two or more States.”54 In cases of original 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court alone may provide remedies, which 
are generally “equitable in nature.”55 
In cases of original jurisdiction, it is common for the Court to 
appoint a Special Master to coordinate the proceedings.56 Once a 
Special Master has been appointed, the Court affords “the Master’s 
findings . . . respect and a tacit presumption of correctness.”57 The 
Court, however, must review the record and reports of any Special 
Master they appoint58 and make the ultimate decision.59 
Through appointment of Special Masters, the Court has previously 
addressed disputes between states60 and, specifically, disputes in which 
states had agreed upon a compact concerning water rights.61 The 
Court has declared that “a compact when approved by Congress 
becomes a law of the United States.”62 Nevertheless, the compact at its 
heart remains a contract.63 
 
 52.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 53.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 
37 U.S. 657, 672 (1838)). 
 54.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 2014). 
 55.  Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 
U.S. 210 (1840)). 
 56.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 734 (1981). 
 57.  Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984). 
 58.  See United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504, 506 (1985). 
 59.  Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 317. 
 60.  See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364 (1976); Vermont v. New York, 
417 U.S. 270, 270 (1974); Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 643; Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 
455, 457, 460 (1935).  
 61.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 90–91 (2004); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 
124, 126–27 (1987). 
 62.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 
(1983)). 
 63.  Id. (quoting Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
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While the Court may provide equitable remedies,64 it does so 
within the confines of contract law.65 Thus, the compact “must be 
construed and applied in accordance with its terms.”66 Where a 
contract’s terms indicate that one party has breached, and the 
contract itself specifies the appropriate remedy, then the Court should 
afford that remedy.67 Conversely, the Court will go as far as to “reform 
a written contract, where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used 
therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and 
intention of the parties.”68 In cases of original jurisdiction, the Court 
can fashion any remedy, including reformation, to reach a “fair and 
equitable solution.”69 The party seeking relief, however, must show 
“proof of mutual mistake . . . ‘of the clearest and most satisfactory 
character.’”70 
The Court can provide a wide variety of remedies to reach an 
equitable solution, especially because it has never directly spoken 
about which damages are most appropriate in cases concerning water-
use compacts. For example, the Court can order monetary damages,71 
as it has done in previous cases concerning compacts between states.72 
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 
normally bars suits against states without their consent,73 does not bar 
the Court from providing a remedy for one state’s suit against 
another.74 In fact, the Court may enter money judgments against 
states despite not having the authority to enforce such judgments.75 
Regardless, states will “almost invariably” comply.76 
 
 64.  Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 648 (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. 210 
(1840)). 
 65.  See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 129. 
 66.  Id. at 128 (citing West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951)). 
 67.  Id. at 129 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) cmt. b (1981)). 
 68.  Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385, 389 (1918). 
 69.  See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 134 (supplying an additional enforcement 
mechanism in order to enforce a compact). 
 70.  Philippine Sugar, 247 U.S. at 391 (quoting Snell v. Ins. Co., 98 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1878)). 
 71.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130 (citing South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 
286 (1904)). 
 72.  See, e.g., id. at 132 (1987); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 589 (1918). 
 73.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 74.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 
n.21 (1981)). 
 75.  Id. at 130–31. 
 76.  Id. at 131 (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. at 592). 
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The Court may also award non-monetary relief.77 For instance, the 
Court has considered awarding damages in the form of actual water.78 
Alternatively, the Court can award injunctive relief, which it has done 
in the form of a decree,79 and by appointing a “River Master,” who 
acts as a mediator between the states.80 An injunction, however, is 
typically meant to serve a deterrent function.81 An injunction does not 
issue by default;82 before providing injunctive relief the Court should 
find that intervention is necessary to protect rights from an 
irremediable threat.83 
IV.  REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 
Mr. Kayatta, as Special Master, made a myriad of 
recommendations in the Fourth Report. Many of those 
recommendations relate to one of two issues: (1) whether a mutual 
mistake persists within the RRCA Accounting Procedures as to the 
treatment of imported water, so that the Court may reform its 
language; and (2) which remedy should be afforded to Kansas.84 
Because Nebraska concedes it failed to comply with the FSS “and 
thereby breached its obligations under the Compact in 2006,”85 all 
parties agree that some remedy is justified. As a result, the second 
issue only concerns which remedy is appropriate. 
A.  Reformation 
The Special Master agreed with Nebraska and Colorado’s 
contentions that the accounting procedures’ treatment of imported 
water consumption diverged from “the parties’ shared intent in 
agreeing to the Accounting Procedures, and to the Compact,” and 
therefore constituted a mutual mistake.86 Imported water 
consumption is not distinguished from virgin water consumption in 
 
 77.  See id. at 129–30 (discussing option to award damages in the form of actual water).  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 133. 
 80.  Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 92 (2004) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 
134–35; New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 1002–04 (1954)). 
 81.  Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
 82.  Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982) (quoting Harrisonville v. 
W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933)). 
 83.  Id. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)). 
 84.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 14. 
 85.  Id. at 87. 
 86.  Id. at 22–23. 
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the RRCA Accounting Procedures.87 This accounting applied to 
roughly 8,000 acre-feet of water in 2006,88 which distorted water-use 
calculations because a riverbed may have no virgin water in it, but 
may yet run flush with imported water.89 
The Special Master cited multiple sources indicating that the 
original intent of the parties was to exclude imported water as part of 
the calculations of water consumption. First, the Special Master noted 
that the Compact declares that it concerns water “‘originating in’ the 
Republican River Basin.”90 Additionally, the Compact goes on to 
declare that “allocations . . . are derived from the computed average 
annual virgin water supply originating in” the Republican River 
Basin.91 Further, the Special Master pointed to language in the FSS 
declaring that “Beneficial Consumptive Use of Imported Water 
Supply shall not count as Computed Beneficial Consumptive Use or 
Virgin Water Supply.”92 Lastly, the Special Master cited language from 
an earlier report, finding that the FSS “resolves this issue by providing 
that beneficial consumptive use of imported water will not count as 
computed beneficial consumptive use or as virgin water supply.”93 
Notably, Kansas indirectly benefits from the current accounting 
procedure, as the procedure does not distinguish Nebraska’s use of 
imported water, which instead counts towards its virgin-water share.94 
Despite the plain language cited above, Kansas argues that the 
burden of proving a mutual mistake falls on Nebraska,95 and that 
Nebraska has not met its burden.96 While the Special Master credited 
Kansas’s statement of the law, he believes that enough evidence exists 
to prove that the parties did not intend to treat imported water the 
same as virgin water.97 The Special Master acknowledged that the 
 
 87.  Id. at 15. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 34. 
 90.  Id. at 23 (quoting Appendices to Report of the Special Master at B4–B5, Kansas v. 
Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013)). 
 91.  Appendices to Report of the Special Master at B4, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, 
Original (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Appendices to the Report]. 
 92.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 24 (quoting Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra 
note 28, at 25). 
 93.  Id. at 25 (quoting Second Report of the Special Master at 64, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 
126, Original (U.S. Apr. 16, 2003)). 
 94.  Id. at 35. 
 95.  Id. at 27. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
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Court has never reformed a compact.98 He noted, however, that the 
accounting procedures fall within the FSS, which is unlike a compact 
and more like a contract because it does not require approval by 
Congress.99 Only agreements between states that alter their respective 
rights require congressional approval, whereas the FSS does not alter 
any of the parties’ rights: it merely provides means to calculate and 
remedy a breach.100 The Special Master pointed to a similar scenario 
from Wisconsin v. Michigan.101 In that case, the Court passed a decree, 
including certain agreed-upon language defining the boundary 
between two states.102 The language, however, contained certain 
mutual mistakes.103 As a result, the Court declared that the language 
should be altered.104 
B.  Remedy 
The Special Master noted that the Compact does not indicate the 
proper remedy for breach.105 Thus, the Court may impose any remedy 
that it considers a “fair and equitable solution.”106 The Court is free to 
assess damages in the form of money rather than water.107 All three 
states have indicated a preference for monetary damages.108 
1.  Disgorgement 
In addition to compensatory damages, Kansas seeks damages that 
take into account its loss and Nebraska’s gain from the latter’s 
overuse of water.109 The Special Master justified awarding these types 
of damages on two bases. First, the Compact outlines each state’s 
water rights.110 Water rights mirror property rights, which may be 
subjected to disgorgement damages where those rights are 
infringed.111 Following this reasoning, “one might fairly say that 
 
 98.  Id. at 38. 
 99.  Id. at 41. 
 100.  Id at 41–42.  
 101.  Id.; Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455 (1935).   
 102.  Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. at 458, 460. 
 103.  Id. at 460. 
 104.  Id. at 462. 
 105.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 127. 
 106.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987). 
 107.  Id. at 130. 
 108.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 129. 
 109.  Id. at 18. 
 110.  Id. at 131. 
 111.  Id. 
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Nebraska took Kansas’ water.”112 Thus, the Special Master argued that 
Nebraska’s taking should be subject to disgorgement damages. 
Second, the Special Master found that the Compact is ultimately 
an act of Congress, and thus a law of the United States.113 Where 
United States law is broken, damages may be “aimed at divesting the 
wrongdoer of any gains derived from the statutory violation.”114 
Under this reasoning disgorgement may also be appropriate. 
Ultimately, while the Special Master acknowledged that contract law 
affords some policy reasons for promoting efficient breach,115 he finds 
that Nebraska’s gain from breach of the Compact far exceeded 
Kansas’s loss.116 Therefore, the Special Master supported an award of 
some disgorgement damages.117 
The Special Master recommended a disgorgement award despite 
declaring that Nebraska did not deliberately breach the terms of the 
Compact.118 Ultimately, the Special Master set the total damages owed 
by Nebraska to Kansas at $5.5 million.119 This amount constitutes $3.7 
million for compensatory damages120 and $1.8 million for 
disgorgement damages.121 
2.  Injunctive Relief 
Kansas also seeks injunctive relief in addition to monetary 
damages.122 The Special Master recognized that an injunction is 
necessary only “in order ‘to prevent future violations,’”123 particularly 
because injunctions are meant to serve a deterrent function.124 While 
Kansas remains skeptical of Nebraska’s willingness to comply with 
the Compact going forward,125 the Special Master recognized that 
Nebraska’s latest Implementation Management Programs have 
reduced its groundwater pumping by 25 percent from when the 
 
 112.  Id. at 132. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. at 132–33.  
 116.  Id. at 178.  
 117.  Id. at 179.  
 118.  Id. at 111.  
 119.  Id. at 179.  
 120.  Id. at 170. 
 121.  Id. at 179.  
 122.  Id.  at 180. 
 123.  Id. at 180–81 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). 
 124.  Id.at 181 (citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)). 
 125.  Id. at 183. 
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settlement was reached.126  Thus, Nebraska has fallen below its 
consumption allocation by an average of approximately 64,000 acre-
feet per year in the five years following the 2006 breach.127 Because of 
Nebraska’s turnaround, the Special Master rejected Kansas’s request 
for an injunction or appointment of a River Master.128 Concerning the 
latter request, the Special Master noted the Court has only resorted to 
appointment of a River Master twice: where cooperation among the 
states was unlikely and where the River Master filled a ministerial 
role.129 Here, however, the Special Master found future disputes, if any, 
would “require discretionary, policy-oriented decisionmaking”130 and 
appointment of a River Master would be inappropriate.131 
V.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Kansas’s Arguments 
Kansas takes exception to many of the Special Master’s 
recommendations. Kansas maintains that there was no mutual 
mistake that justifies reformation of the accounting procedures.132 
Kansas also contests the Special Master’s denial of injunctive relief, as 
well as his endorsement of only $1.8 million in disgorgement 
damages.133 
Kansas counters the Special Master’s finding that the FSS 
contained a mutual mistake, pointing to the fact that the FSS was “an 
extensive and technically detailed compromise.”134 As Kansas puts it, 
“the parties got what they bargained for in 2002; there was no mutual 
mistake.”135 In fact, Kansas contends that the parties “made a 
deliberate choice” not to separate imported water as part of the 
accounting procedures.136 Kansas specifically emphasizes that one of 
Colorado’s experts explicitly recognized the non-linearity of the 
 
 126.  Id. at 114. 
 127.  Id.  at 116. 
 128.  Id. at 184. 
 129.  Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987)). 
 130.  Id. at 186 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 92 (2004)). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Exceptions by Plaintiff State of Kansas to the Report of the Special Master and Brief 
in Support of Exceptions at i, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Feb. 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions]. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 6.  
 135.  Id. at 17. 
 136.  Id. at 8. 
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accounting system during negotiations.137 
Kansas further argues that Nebraska has not met the immense 
burden of proving mutual mistake.138 Kansas stresses that “[t]he 
mistake must be common and mutual to both parties”139 and proven 
by “clear and convincing evidence.”140 Additionally, Kansas notes that 
reforming a contract based on mutual mistake constitutes an 
“extraordinary equitable remedy.”141 
Kansas also questions the Special Master’s conclusion regarding 
whether FSS’s accounting procedures were the “best possible method 
for addressing groundwater consumption based on present-day 
understandings.”142 Kansas alleges that the Special Master found 
mutual mistake by the mere existence of a better accounting system.143 
Kansas argues that the existence of a more efficient system does not 
necessarily mean the parties made a mistake in their particular choice 
of which system to use,144 and that Nebraska has failed to put forth 
evidence to prove otherwise.145 Kansas further contends that 
Nebraska, to prove mutual mistake, has to show what the parties 
intended to agreed upon.146 Otherwise, as here, alteration may do 
more than fix inadvertent error, and may instead change the entire 
method by which states address their apportionment of water.147 
Kansas further disputes the Special Master’s recommended 
remedies. Kansas contends that injunctive relief is appropriate. 
Particularly, Kansas emphasizes that “the Court may order ‘such 
appropriate decree as the facts might be found to justify.’”148 Kansas 
posits that the balance of equities warrants injunctive relief because 
Nebraska has consistently breached the Compact.149 Kansas claims 
that it suffers irreparable harm when Nebraska breaches,150 and a 
 
 137.  Id. at 27. 
 138.  Id. at 19.  
 139.  Id. (quoting Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., 87 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1874)). 
 140.  Id. at 29. (citing Nash Finch Co. v. Rubloff Hastings, LLC, 341 F.3d 
846, 850 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 141.  Id. at 19 (quoting Mark Andy, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 229 F.3d 710, 716 (8th Cir. 
2000)). 
 142.  Id. at 22. 
 143.  Id. at 23. 
 144.  Id. at 22–23. 
 145.  Id. at 29. 
 146.  Id. at 29–30 (citing Loewenson v. London Mkt. Cos., 351 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 147.  Id. at 32. 
 148.  Id. at 35 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902)). 
 149.  Id. at 37. 
 150.  Id. at 38. 
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compliance order will not impede Nebraska as long as it complies.151 
Kansas also expresses concern that future breaches on Nebraska’s 
part will require return trips to the Supreme Court.152 
Finally, Kansas takes exception to the Special Master’s award of 
$1.8 million in disgorgement damages, arguing that it is too small. 
Kansas points to the Special Master’s admission that Nebraska gained 
upwards of $25 million for its overuse.153 Kansas argues that an award 
of merely $1.8 million in disgorgement will fail in its deterrent 
function,154 as a disgorgement of only $1.8 million, compared to 
Nebraska’s $25 million gain, may incentivize future breach. 
B.  Nebraska’s Arguments 
Nebraska principally takes exception to the $1.8 million 
disgorgement award. First, Nebraska notes that the Special Master 
admitted that a disgorgement award in this context is 
“unprecedented.”155 Nebraska emphasizes a “Compact is, after all, a 
contract.”156 As a result, it argues that no damages are available 
beyond what is generally awarded in contract law: compensation 
damages.157 
Nebraska further contests the Special Master’s basis in property 
rights for awarding disgorgement. Nebraska highlights that it only 
infringed Kansas’s water rights temporarily, not in perpituity.158 
Consequently, Nebraska claims any disgorgement is warranted only to 
the extent required to return Kansas to the position it otherwise 
would have occupied.159 Further, Nebraska contends that 
disgorgement would not serve a deterrent function, because, as the 
Special Master admitted, “Nebraska’s Integrated Management 
Plans . . . and actions to be taken thereunder alleviate any concerns 
about future violations.”160 
 
 
 
 151.  Id. at 39. 
 152.  Id. at 43. 
 153.  Id. at 55. 
 154.  Id. at 53. 
 155.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 9. 
 156.  Id. at 10 (quoting Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n., 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959)). 
 157.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, cmt. e). 
 158.  Id. at 13. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 14 (citing Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 116–27). 
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Nebraska also asserts that disgorgement requires “intentional 
interference with legal entitlements,”161 so disgorgement is not 
warranted here where interference was not intentional. Nebraska 
remarks that the Republican River Basin experienced “an 
unprecedented drought” in the years in which it consumed above its 
allocation,162 leading to its greater reliance on the basin’s water. 
Further, Nebraska contends that it began its Implementation 
Management Programs to reduce groundwater pumping as early as 
2004.163 These actions resulted in roughly a 36 percent reduction in 
groundwater pumping between 2002 and 2006.164 Because of the 
drought and Nebraska’s mitigation efforts, Nebraska argues that it 
“did not ‘knowingly’ violate the Compact” and thus disgorgement is 
inappropriate.165 
C.  Colorado’s Arguments 
Colorado’s exceptions to the Fourth Report largely echo the 
exceptions taken by its fellow defendant, Nebraska. Like Nebraska, 
Colorado argues disgorgement is unwarranted, mirroring Nebraska’s 
contention that an unprecedented drought impeded Nebraska’s 
otherwise “sincere efforts to reduce its allocation.”166 
To aid its argument, Colorado points to another case in which the 
Special Master denied Kansas’s request for disgorgement because the 
breach of a compact “was not intentional.”167 In Kansas v. Colorado,168 
Kansas sought disgorgement from Colorado169 for its overuse of water 
from the Arkansas River, contrary to the terms of a compact between 
the states.170 The Special Master in that case recommended no 
disgorgement award, based on Colorado’s lack of intent to violate the 
 
 161.  Nebraska’s Brief in Reply to Exceptions by Kansas at 32, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, 
Original (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014). 
 162.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 17. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 111 (reporting that Nebraska’s ground water 
pumping fell from more than 1,400,000 acre-feet in 2002 to less than 900,000 acre-feet in 2006). 
 165.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 16. 
 166.  Colorado’s Sur-Reply in Support of its Exception at 7, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, 
Original. (U.S. Apr. 30, 2014). 
 167.  Colorado’s Exception to the Report of the Special Master and Brief in Support of 
Exception at 4, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original. (U.S. Feb. 27, 2014) [hereinafter 
Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support]. 
 168.  Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1999). 
 169.  Third Report, supra note 29, at 75. 
 170.  Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 679–80. 
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compact.171 Colorado points out that, similar to the Special Master in 
Kansas v. Colorado, the Special Master here has stated that Nebraska 
did not intend to breach.172 Instead, Nebraska inadvertently breached 
after honest attempts to comply.173 While Colorado concedes that the 
Court did not directly address the disgorgement issue in Kansas v. 
Colorado, the Court did accept the Special Master’s 
recommendations twice.174 Colorado contends that the Court should 
not award disgorgement here.175 
Additionally, Colorado argues that the Special Master’s $1.8 
million disgorgement award “would result in a windfall to Kansas.”176 
Colorado emphasizes that while the Court sits with equitable power, 
its ultimate remedy must not be arbitrary or capricious.177 Colorado 
argues the Special Master failed to determine Nebraska’s actual gains 
from its overuse, and $1.8 million in disgorgement does not relate to 
Kansas’s loss.178 As a result, Colorado asserts that this $1.8 million 
disgorgement would be arbitrary.179 
Finally, Colorado proclaims its support for the Special Master’s 
denial of injunctive relief to Kansas. Colorado argues against Kansas’s 
justification that any future breach will require return trips to the 
Supreme Court.180 Colorado points to the FSS’s requirement that the 
RRCA first hear disputes between the parties,181 and thereafter the 
parties must additionally submit to arbitration.182 Both of these 
forums may provide redress before the Supreme Court would be 
bothered. 
 
 171.  Third Report, supra note 29, at 80 (citing First Report, supra note 37, at 169). 
 172.  Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 6 (citing Fourth Report, 
supra note 6, at 111). 
 173.  Id. (citing Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 130–31). 
 174.  Id. at 8 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 6 (2001), and Kansas v. Colorado, 522 
U.S. 1073 (1998)). 
 175.  Colorado’s Sur-Reply in Support of its Exception at, supra note 166, at 7. 
 176.  Id. at 9. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 10. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Colorado’s Reply in Opposition to Kansas’s Exceptions at 11, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 
126, Original (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 
132, at 43). 
 181.  Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 12 (citing Final 
Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra note 28, at 34–35). 
 182.  Id. (citing Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra note 28, at 39). 
PUNIA 11.18.14 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2014  3:58 PM 
2014] KANSAS V. NEBRASKA & COLORADO: KEEPING EQUITY AFLOAT 17 
D.  The United States’s Position 
While the United States is not a party to the case, the Court has 
invited the United States to express its opinion in an amicus brief.183 
The United States supports approval of the Special Master’s Report 
in its entirety.184 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court will now have to decide whether to approve 
the recommendations issued by the Special Master, support any of the 
state’s exceptions, or fashion its own equitable remedy. While the 
Court has previously set aside some of its Special Masters’ 
recommendations,185 many prior cases also approve Special Master 
recommendations,186 indicating a tendency towards deference. The 
Court may also be influenced by the opinion of the United States, 
which fully supports the Special Master’s recommendations.187 
Nebraska and Colorado’s position in opposition to Kansas’s 
exceptions, echoing the positions of the Special Master and United 
States, better draw upon the facts and settled law than do Kansas’s 
exceptions. The current accounting system as propagated by the FSS 
counts imported water towards each state’s consumption.188 Kansas 
asserts that this treatment was intentional, and therefore the FSS 
contained no mutual mistake.189 The plain language of both the 
Compact and the FSS, however, indicate otherwise. Both documents 
clearly state that the Republican River allocation considers only 
virgin water supply. 190 The FSS specifically excludes imported water 
from calculations.191 
 
 
 
 183.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 378, 378 (2010). 
 184.  Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 2. 
 185.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 96 (2004) (setting aside part of a Special 
Master’s recommendations). 
 186.  See, e.g., id. at 91–92, 102–05; Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 127–28 (1987). 
 187.  Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 2. 
 188.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 15. 
 189.  Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 132, at i. 
 190.  Appendices to the Report, supra note 91, at B4–B5; Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, 
supra note 28, at 25. 
 191.  See Appendices to the Report, supra note 91, at B4–B5 (“Beneficial Consumptive Use 
of Imported Water shall not count as Computed Beneficial Consumptive Use or Virgin Water 
Supply.”). 
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Because the Compact is an act of Congress,192 the Court will 
interpret it by first looking to its language.193 With such clear language, 
the Court will not be persuaded by Kansas’s contentions that the 
current accounting treatment was a point of bargain. The intent of the 
parties is frustrated by the accounting procedure’s inadvertent 
treatment of imported water. The language of the Compact supports 
that the agreement is limited to virgin water; an accounting treatment 
that includes imported water must have been a mistake. Therefore, 
the Court should reform the FSS’s accounting procedures to better 
reflect the parties’ intent and remedy the mutual mistake. 
The Court would create an injustice for Nebraska by strictly 
interpreting the accounting procedures as written. The current 
accounting procedures distort the allocation in its inclusion of 
imported water194 by charging Nebraska for virgin water that it does 
not use. The Court, however, seeks a fair and equitable solution.195 An 
equitable solution would not charge Nebraska for water it does not 
use, particularly when a more accurate system is within reason.196 
Additionally, the Special Master offered convincing arguments for 
denying the injunctive relief sought by Kansas. Injunctive relief is 
meant to serve a deterrent function.197 To obtain injunctive relief 
Kansas must convince the Court that its rights are severely 
threatened.198 Kansas has not met this burden. While Nebraska 
concedes its violation in 2006,199 the Special Master presented ample 
evidence concerning its compliance in every year since.200 
Finally, Kansas, echoing the Special Master, presents the most 
persuasive arguments concerning the feasibility of some disgorgement 
award. Kansas argues that the disgorgement award should be even 
greater than the $1.8 million recommended by the Special Master to 
 
 192.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 
554, 564 (1983)). 
 193.  Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 
442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)). 
 194.  Grant Harse, Nebraska’s Costs of Compliance with the Republican River Compact: An 
Equitable Solution, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 124, 146 (2009). 
 195.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987). 
 196.  Harse, supra note 194, at 145. 
 197.  Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
 198.  Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Cavanaugh v. 
Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)). 
 199.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 2. 
 200.  See Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 111 (reporting that Nebraska’s ground water 
pumping fell from more than 1,400,000 acre-feet in 2002 to less than 900,000 acre-feet in 2006). 
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effectively serve its deterrent function.201 Nebraska and Colorado 
oppose the award,202 arguing that the award is unprecedented.203 The 
Court, however, has plenary power to institute a solution that it 
deems fair and equitable.204  
Nebraska also tries to argue that disgorgement is not warranted 
because it did not knowingly breach.205  While Nebraska may have 
taken some efforts to avoid breach, its breach was inevitable. 
Nebraska, while making efforts to reduce its water consumption, 
overused its allowance from 2003 through 2005, so that vast under-
usage would have been required in 2006 for compliance.206 
Despite the feasibility of some disgorgement award, Colorado 
argues that the Special Master’s specific award of $1.8 million was 
arbitrary, and thus not proper.207 The Court may be persuaded to 
depart from the Special Master’s recommendation on this issue. The 
Special Master failed to set specific parameters for his calculation, 
merely citing that the $1.8 million “represents a disgorgement of the 
amount by which Nebraska’s gain exceeds Kansas’s loss.”208 Further, 
while Kansas claims economic loss from Nebraska’s breach, some 
commentators argue that Kansas in fact suffered no harm.209 While 
Kansas’s claimed losses remain speculative, Nebraska has already 
expended many resources in complying with the Compact’s 
requirements.210 Again, the Court must reach a fair and equitable 
solution,211 which does not include a damages award chosen at 
random. While the Court may find that some disgorgement is not 
arbitrary, in the interest of fairness and equity it will probably require 
greater justification for the ultimate award. 
 
 201.  Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 132, at 53. 
 202.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 10; Colorado’s 
Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 4. 
 203.  Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 9. 
 204.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987). 
 205.  Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 4. 
 206.  Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 8. 
 207.  Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 9. 
 208.  Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 179. 
 209.  Harse, supra note 194, at 146–47 (citing Editorial, River Details Preliminary 
Republican River Decisions Seem to Lean to Nebraska, Omaha World-Herald, Dec. 18, 2008, at 
06B). 
 210.  Id. at 147. 
 211.  Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Cases of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, such as 
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, reach as far back as the 
Constitution’s enactment. In this context, the Court plays a vital role 
as referee between the sovereign States. Ultimately, the Court’s goal is 
to reach fair and equitable solutions. Here, the Court can achieve this 
goal by reforming the mutual mistake in the FSS’s accounting 
procedures. Currently, the accounting procedures include imported 
water as part of the virgin-water calculation, despite the Compact’s 
plain language and clear intent stating otherwise. Additionally, the 
Court would create injustice by denying reformation, thereby 
approving a system that charges one state more than it uses. Finally, 
the Court may include a disgorgement award as part of its equitable 
relief of a knowing breach. The Court, however, must be careful to 
impose only damages that it can substantiate; otherwise fairness is not 
attained. Fair and equitable relief will produce goodwill between the 
States, which is of paramount concern because they are bound 
together indefinitely. 
 
